Review & Summary of the Digital Asset Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2023

This case is relevant to the research request because it addresses the constitutionality of a Florida law. However, it does not directly answer the research request because it does not address the specific bill in ‘SIL23929.pdf’ or the constitutionality of any law under Wyoming’s state constitution.

“Although such an inquiry is appropriate under the strict scrutiny standard of review, which requires that the legislative conclusions be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, it is an inappropriate judicial inquiry under the rational basis standard of review. Even the petitioners conceded at oral argument that under rational basis review it was within the Legislature’s discretion to adopt the 1900-foot removal radius based on the Gottwald report.”

“We agree with this determination and for all the reasons discussed above conclude that the Citrus Canker Law withstands the substantive due process challenge. “Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue,” Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 588 So.2d at 960, and requires both fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”

“Because the State has chosen to pay compensation for those healthy but exposed trees that are destroyed under the Citrus Canker Eradication Program, under our deferential standard of review we must defer to the Legislature’s evaluation of the relevant scientific evidence and to the Legislature’s choice of means to eradicate citrus canker.”

This case is relevant to the research request because it discusses the constitutionality of a Florida bill under federal law. However, it does not address the constitutionality of the bill in ‘SIL23929.pdf’ specifically, nor does it address the Wyoming state constitution.

“Because the record does not contain evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of either disparate impact or discriminatory intent for the solicitation provision and drop-box provision, neither provision violates the Constitution. The registration-delivery provision presents a closer question. Sufficient evidence exists in the record to uphold the finding, on clear-error review, that the provision will have a disparate impact on black voters. But a finding of disparate impact alone cannot support a finding that the registration-delivery provision violates the Constitution. Id. at 1322. Other evidence, at most, establishes that some legislators knew that black voters are more likely than white voters to register to vote using third-party voter-registration organizations.”

The case is relevant to the research request because it discusses the constitutionality of a Florida statute under both the United States and Florida Constitutions. However, the case does not address the constitutionality of the bill in ‘SIL23929.pdf’ specifically, nor does it address the Wyoming Constitution.

“The Court held that the statute comported with due process because, as a whole, the statute adequately protected the parties’ interests. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 610.”

“Additionally, because the statute creates substantive rights and any procedural provisions are directly related to the definition of those rights, we hold that section 702.10(2) does not infringe on this Court’s rulemaking authority. Therefore, we find that the statute is constitutional under both the United States and Florida Constitutions.”

This case does not directly answer the research request, but it may be relevant for its discussion of federal preemption and the Supremacy Clause. However, the case was overruled or reversed, so its persuasive value is diminished.

“On December 30, 2019, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and found that despite plaintiffs’ delay in seeking immediate intervention, plaintiffs nonetheless had carried their burden at this early stage of the litigation by raising serious questions going to the merits of the dispute and showing the balance of hardship tipped in their favor.”

“FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (“FAA”) “The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.””

“The Supreme Court has “described this provision as reflecting both a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.””

“III. ASSEMBLY BILL 51 A. Statutory Text California Assembly Bill 51 aims to make two additions to California’s statutory scheme, section 12953 to the Government Code and section 432.6 to the Labor Code.”

“That statute, as set forth in the bill, provides: (a)”

Dodds v. Richardson is not directly relevant to the research request, as it does not address the constitutionality of a bill. However, it does discuss the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which may be useful background information for analyzing the bill’s constitutionality under federal law. The case does not address the state constitutions of Florida or Wyoming.

“Holder v. Town of Newton, 638 F.Supp.2d 150, 153 (D.N.H. 2009) (citing Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 714 (8th Cir. 2004) and Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 117 (D.D.C. 2007)). “[T]he right of an accused to freedom pending trial is inherent in the concept of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.””

“Consequently, the denial of bail must comport with the requirements of due process. See id. at 792 (“[S]tate statutes restricting bail must be rational, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. . . . [B]ail may not be denied `without the application of a reasonably clear legal standard and the statement of a rational basis for the denial.'” (quoting Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1981))). In Gaylor v. Does, 105 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1997), we further clarified the due process protections involving bail.”

The case State of Tex. v. United States does not directly answer the research request, but it does provide some relevant background information. The case discusses the constitutionality of a federal statute that preempts state law, and the court ultimately upholds the statute against various constitutional challenges. This case may be useful for analogizing to the bill in ‘SIL23929.pdf’ if that bill also preempts state law. However, without more information about the bill, it is difficult to assess the case’s relevance with certainty. Additionally, the case is from 1984, so it may not reflect the most current law on the subject.

“See EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1061 n. 10, 75 L.Ed.2d 18; FERC v. Mississippi, 1982, 456 U.S. 742, 759, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2137, 72 L.Ed.2d 532; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association, 1981, 452 U.S. 264, 286, 289-91, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2365, 2366-68, 69 L.Ed.2d 1; see also Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 4 Cir. 1979, 611 F.2d 53, 54-55; City of New York v. United States Department of Transportation, S.D.N.Y. 1982, 539 F. Supp. 1237, 1253, rev’d on other grounds, 2 Cir. 1983, 715 F.2d 732; La Pierre, supra, at 796 n. 55. Federal legislation that preempts state regulation of private activity does not regulate the states as states.”

“We need not address such ominous possibilities in this case.”

“Because the Staggers Act does not regulate the states as states, it does not offend National League of Cities.”

“The challenged sections of the Act are facially constitutional.”

“A Government formed of such extensive powers ought to be well organized. . . . . . . . . To give the new system its proper energy it will be desirable to have it ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by that of the Legislatures. The Origins of the Three Branches of Government, id., at 4-5.”

“The genius of the Constitution of the United States of America is that it establishes a unique form of federalism, unlike any ever fashioned before, that harmonizes and accommodates in new and distinctive ways national and state centers of governmental power. Second. The authority for this new form of federalism is declared by “the people, and not merely by the Legislatures.” See id. at 5.”

“”The aim of the American legal system is liberty and justice for all.”

“JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, concurring. The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign immunity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that violates the Constitution. Ante, at 159. And the state defendants have correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Title II is constitutional insofar as it authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State.”

“Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to proceed with a § 1983 claim based on the prison staff’s supposed `deliberate indifference’ to his serious medical condition of being partially paraplegic. . . .” App. A to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a (citation and footnote omitted).”

“See Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1977) ( Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 258 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.Pa. 1966), aff’d, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054, 88 S.Ct. 802, 19 L.Ed.2d 849 (1968) ( Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases). The language in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), quoted by the plaintiffs, is not to the contrary.”

“Presser directly bears on the issue of whether the states or their political subdivisions are limited by the Second Amendment, and it is still good law, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary. Presser controls this court and, therefore, requires it to hold that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states and localities and so is not infringed by the Morton Grove ordinance.”

“B. Ninth Amendment The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

“On September 1, 1954, an amendment to this statute extended the time of limitation to five years and provided expressly that the extended period should apply to offenses prior to the enactment of the amendment, if the prosecution had not been then already barred. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282, as amended by this Act, is as follows: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed. As amended Sept. 1, 1954, c. 1214, § 10(a), 68 Stat. 1145.””

“The amendment was not an ex post facto law. It did not render a previously innocent act criminal.”

“The new statute was not an ex post facto law.”