Introduction
The cases and statutes related to Walker v. THI of New Mexico primarily involve issues of personal jurisdiction, Title VII liability, and the “integrated enterprise” theory. For those seeking the full text of the case, WALKER v. THI OF NEW MEXICO AT HOBBS CENTER.
Background of the Case
The case revolves around the plaintiff, employed as a Business Office Manager at THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, a nursing home in Hobbs, New Mexico. The plaintiff, an African American, alleged that she was subjected to racial discrimination during her employment and was wrongfully terminated because of her race. This case not only highlights issues of racial discrimination but also brings into question the corporate relationships and legal responsibilities within the THI of New Mexico’s corporate structure.
Continuing to the next sections, we will delve into the key legal issues, court proceedings and rulings, discussion of legal principles, implications of the case, and finally, a simplified explanation in layman terms. Please let me know if you would like to proceed with this approach.
Key Legal Issues
In Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, several critical legal issues were brought to the forefront. Firstly, the issue of personal jurisdiction became a cornerstone of the case. The concept of personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process; this becomes complex in cases involving corporate entities with multiple affiliations across states. The plaintiff’s argument hinged on the assertion that the corporate structure and operational integration of THI entities conferred sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction in New Mexico.
Another pivotal issue revolved around the application of the ‘minimum contacts’ principle. This legal doctrine dictates that for a state to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the latter must have at least “minimum contacts” with the state. The court’s interpretation of this principle in relation to the interconnected operations of THI’s corporate entities was crucial.
Furthermore, the case explored the single-employer theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This theory posits that separate entities can be considered a single employer for liability purposes under certain conditions, such as common management, interrelation of operations, and centralized control of labor relations. The application of this theory was central to determining whether THI’s corporate structure could be held liable under Title VII for the alleged discrimination.
Analysis
Several of the cases found in the search results are directly related to Walker v. THI of New Mexico, as they are earlier decisions in the same case. These cases address issues such as discovery sanctions, the denial of a motion to stay deposition discovery, and the denial of a motion to bifurcate the case. The cases that are not directly related to Walker v. THI of New Mexico still provide some relevant information. For example, Myers v. GGNSC Holdings, LLC discusses the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the context of a nursing home injury claim, which may be analogous to the issues in Walker. Young v. Lugo discusses issues related to searches and seizures, which may also be relevant to Walker depending on the specific facts and legal issues involved. The most relevant case outside of the Walker decisions is Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, which cites Walker in its analysis of personal jurisdiction. The case also discusses the application of the “integrated enterprise” theory in the context of Title VII liability, which may be relevant to Walker depending on the specific issues involved.
Court Proceedings and Rulings
The case’s journey through the legal system was marked by several significant rulings. In the initial proceedings, the district court grappled with the complex corporate structure of THI and its subsidiaries. The court’s analysis of the interconnections between these entities was pivotal in its decision on personal jurisdiction. The court meticulously examined the nature and extent of THI’s operations in New Mexico, their managerial and operational integration, and the degree of control exerted over the Hobbs Center.
Subsequently, the court addressed the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. In evaluating this motion, the court considered the evidence presented by both parties concerning the alleged discriminatory practices and the grounds for the plaintiff’s termination. The rulings on these motions were instrumental in shaping the course of the litigation, as they determined the legal framework within which the case would be decided.
Discussion of Legal Principles
At the heart of Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center were fundamental legal principles governing corporate law and employment discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Mexico Human Rights Act were central to the plaintiff’s claims. These laws prohibit employment discrimination based on race and impose liabilities on employers who violate these provisions.
The application of corporate law principles was equally significant. The court’s interpretation of the single-employer theory and the doctrine of minimum contacts provided a nuanced understanding of how corporate structures can influence legal liabilities. The case thus serves as a critical reference point for understanding how courts may approach complex corporate relationships in employment discrimination cases.
Implications of the Case
The decision in Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center carries significant implications for both employment law and corporate liability. This case serves as a precedent in understanding how courts may interpret the application of personal jurisdiction in cases involving complex corporate structures. The rulings on the ‘minimum contacts’ and the single-employer theory under Title VII highlight the evolving nature of legal interpretations in the context of modern corporate operations.
For employment law, this case underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of race-based discrimination claims within corporate settings. It brings to light the challenges employees face in proving such claims, especially when dealing with multifaceted corporate entities. The court’s analysis provides a roadmap for future claimants on how to approach cases involving allegations of discrimination in similarly structured corporations.
From a corporate liability perspective, the case emphasizes the need for corporations to have clear policies and practices to prevent racial discrimination. It also highlights the potential legal repercussions for corporations that fail to address such issues adequately within their various entities. The court’s interpretation of the single-employer theory could prompt corporations to reevaluate their management and operational structures to mitigate potential legal risks.
In Layman Terms
In simpler terms, Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center was a case that revolved around accusations of racial discrimination in a workplace setting. It brought into question how a company can be held responsible for discriminatory practices, especially when the company is part of a larger group of interconnected entities. The court looked closely at how these different parts of the company worked together and whether this connection was strong enough to hold the larger entity responsible under the law.
The significance of this case lies in its demonstration of how courts might handle discrimination cases within complex corporate structures. It’s a reminder that companies need to be vigilant about preventing discrimination at all levels and locations. For employees, it sheds light on the legal avenues available and the challenges they might face in proving discrimination in such environments.
Cases:
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Myers v. GGNSC Holdings, LLC is relevant to the research request as it involves a dispute over the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the context of a nursing home injury claim. However, the case is from a different jurisdiction (N.D. Miss.) and does not directly mention Walker v. THI of New Mexico.
“CASE NO. 2:11CV133-B-A 05-08-2013 LEXIE M. MYERS PLAINTIFF v. GGNSC Holdings, LLC GGNSC Southaven, LLC d/b/a Golden Living Center Southaven DEFENDANTS NEAL B. BIGGERS Presently before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the proceeding or alternatively, to compel arbitration [9]. Upon due consideration of the parties’ filings and supporting and opposing authority, the court is ready to rule.”
“Congress provided in the Federal Arbitration Act that a written agreement to arbitrate in a contract involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. In addition, the FAA expresses a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
“There is a two-step inquiry to determine whether a party should be compelled to arbitrate. Washington Mut. Fin. v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004).”
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Young v. Lugo is potentially relevant to the research request because it discusses issues related to searches and seizures, which may be analogous to the issues in Walker v. THI of New Mexico. However, without more information about the facts and legal issues in Walker v. THI of New Mexico, it is difficult to assess the extent of the relevance.
“The court went on to recognize that it was unlikely that the search would have occurred without the search warrant and that by “searching Plaintiff’s person at the compulsion of the police in order to locate and seize illegal narcotics, [the nurse] was performing] a role traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Id. So too here, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Hernandez would not have performed a cavity search and x-ray on Plaintiff had it not been for the compulsion of the police officers to locate and seize contraband.”
“According to Plaintiff, Defendant Hernandez otherwise did not provide other typical medical provider functions such as making efforts to determine whether Plaintiff had taken medications (legal or otherwise) or took a medical history. (Id. at ¶ 33.)”
“See Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F.Supp.2d 103, 109 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (“[I]f the decision to commit [plaintiff] was based purely on [defendant’s] own independent medical judgment, [the] Defendants would be correct that they are not state actors. . . However, [plaintiff] was admitted to [the hospital] without any independent examination.”)”
“D. Failure to State a Claim Defendant Hernandez contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient factual allegations as against Defendant Hernandez to state a claim for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, fabrication of evidence under section 1983 and the torts negligence and medical malpractice. (DE 177 at 18-22.)”
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The case Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC is relevant to the research request because it cites Walker v. THI of New Mexico in its analysis of personal jurisdiction. However, the relevance is limited because the citation is brief and the case does not discuss Walker in depth.
“Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, 801 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1153 (D.N.M. 2011). Rather, the Texas Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs seeking to fuse a parent and its subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes must prove the parent controls the internal business operations and affairs of the subsidiary to a degree greater than that normally associated with common ownership and directorship. Id. (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 799 (Tex. 2002)).”
“See, e.g., Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1978); Prod.”
“Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983).”
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The case cited in the search result, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, is relevant to the research request because it discusses the application of the “integrated enterprise” theory in the context of Title VII liability. However, the search result does not provide enough information to determine whether the two cases involve similar facts or legal issues.
“Indeed, that BPI may “be liable under Title VII if the Court has personal jurisdiction over them is not relevant to the question whether the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over them,” and conversely “if the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over [them], it cannot render a valid judgment on the merits of other issues”—including whether BPI and the other Defendants are part of a single, integrated enterprise. Id. at 1154 (citations omitted).”
“But see King v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of DFW, No. 3:05–CV–0026–D, 2006 WL 784885, at *4 (N.D.Tex. March 28, 2006) (“Because King has made a prima facie showing that Enterprise Company was her employer and discriminated and retaliated against her in Texas, where she was employed, she has likewise made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction, i.e., that Enterprise Company’s contacts with Texas arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action.”); Procaccino–Hague v. Boll Filter Corp., No. 303CV1560(GLG), 2004 WL 78155, at *3 (D.Conn.”
“However, that theory is no longer valid under Texas law.”
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Lunnon v. United States is relevant to the research request because it discusses the application of various tax statutes and regulations, which may be analogous to the issues in Walker v. THI of New Mexico. However, without more information about the specific issues in Walker, it is difficult to assess the extent of the relevance.
“His merits argument centers on the phrase “provisions of law in that regard” in § 7422(a), which provides: No suit prior to filing claim for refund.–No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof. § 7422(a) (emphasis added). Lunnon contends that § 7422(a)’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to a refund claim based on a § 6330 violation because there are no “provisions of law in that regard,” § 7422(a), that specifically apply to a § 6330 refund claim.”
“In Wyodak Resources Development Corp. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 2011), this court explained that § 7422’s exhaustion requirement and § 1346’s grant of jurisdiction over civil actions seeking to recover taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected “work together to require that all tax refund claimants seeking relief in district court must first exhaust their administrative remedies with the Secretary of the Treasury,” and to hold otherwise “would create a class of claims over which district courts possessed jurisdiction regardless of exhaustion.””
“Because Lunnon did not file an administrative claim for a refund or credit, sovereign immunity deprived the district court of jurisdiction.”
“C. Claim four: RICO In claim four, Lunnon asserted a RICO scheme between TUPSS and Lyons, named in his individual capacity, to fraudulently divert to the IRS money TUPSS owed Kendrick.”
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“Auth. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 102 F.Supp.3d 688, 698 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137 F.Supp.3d 817, 848 (D.S.C. 2015); Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 1197415, at *7 n.3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). I agree. Section 1557’s incorporation of “[t]he enforcement mechanisms” of other statutes is congressional recognition that the act can be enforced through the kind of private right of action authorized by the referenced statutes.”
“Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). The same reasoning applies here to § 1557.”
“Examining § 1557 closely, I conclude that Congress intended to create a private right of action.”
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“Patient sued hospital and physicians, alleging that hospital failed to obtain patient’s informed consent to use Acromed devices, and that defendants engaged in civil conspiracy. Patient also sought punitive damages.”
“STANDARD OF REVIEW In this Motion, Defendants seek Judgment on the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).”
“COUNT III Count III is a claim against Methodist alleging that Methodist failed to obtain Corrigan’s informed consent to the use of the Acromed devices.”
“We find that Corrigan has pleaded sufficient facts to maintain her cause of action against Methodist.”
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“Civil No. 2:10-cv-00791. July 12, 2011 DAVID NORTON, District Judge This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”
“Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the burden for summary judgment may be discharged by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).”
“In a negligence action, plaintiff must show: (1) defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (2) defendant breached the duty by negligence act or omission; (3) defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered an injury or damages.”
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“I. Background The United States subsidizes health care for certain individuals through two programs: Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare is a national program for the elderly and disabled that the federal government funds and administers. Medicaid, meanwhile, is a network of statewide programs, funded by both the federal government and the states, that helps cover medical costs for people with limited income.”
“After working at the Nursing Home for thirty-eight years, Relator was fired in 2012.”
“Relator decided to challenge this alleged misconduct by bringing a qui tam action against CHS, the Nursing Home, and the Medical Center under the FCA and NYFCA.”
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“Civil Action 5: 22-089-DCR 01-23-2023 TINA GREEN, as Guardian of Darrell Williams, Plaintiff, v. BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC, doing business as BROOKDALE RICHMOND PLACE SNF KY, et al., Defendants. Danny C Reeves, Judge MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Danny C Reeves, Judge Darrell Williams experienced a wound on his leg while he was a resident of Brookdale Richmond Place, a long-term care facility located in Lexington, Kentucky.”
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).”
“A federal court sitting in diversity ordinarily applies the substantive law of the state in which it sits.”
“Kentucky law generally requires a plaintiff alleging medical negligence to put forth expert testimony to show that the defendant medical provider failed to conform to the applicable standard of care.”
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“Indeed, the complaint does not allege any specific contact between most of them and this state, let alone contacts sufficient to satisfy the state long-arm statute and the Due Process analysis. The plaintiffs’ allege, however, that the many defendants together effectively constitute a single defendant, and that the in-state actions of the Connecticut companies are therefore the actions of the whole, multi-state enterprise, and personal jurisdiction is appropriate over the whole. The plaintiffs argue that all of the defendants together are “joint employers” and that they constitute a “single integrated enterprise.” The plaintiffs argue both theories and blur their distinction, but they are conceptually distinguishable, as the Second Circuit articulated them in Clinton’s Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B.: A “single employer” situation exists where two nominally separate entities are actually part of a single integrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact only a single employer. The single employer standard is relevant when separate corporations are not what they appear to be, that in truth they are but divisions or departments of a single enterprise.”
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“Eisenhour v. Cnty., 897 F.3d 1272, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Reckless or callous indifference means acting “in the face of a perceived risk that [one’s] actions will violate federal law.””
“Estate of Beauford, 35 F.4th at 1262; Prince, 28 F.4th at 1044. Detention officers are deliberately indifferent when they intentionally interfere with access to medical care, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, but not if they refer the inmate for treatment.”
“Franklin v. Toal, 19 P.3d 834, 837 (Okla. 2001).”
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“Texas cases providing a right of equitable subrogation to an excess carrier involve an excess carrier suing a primary carrier, where their respective policies overlap temporally. See, e.g., Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1992) (allowing equitable subrogation by an excess carrier to the insured’s Stowers claim against the primary carrier). That is not the case here as to Evanston.”
“This case potentially presents the issue of whether recent Texas cases have eroded the underpinnings of Canal even in cases of temporally overlapping excess and primary policies, such as those of North American and Royal.”
“Mid-Continent distinguishes Canal as follows: “In Canal, we recognized equitable subrogation as a basis for an excess insurer’s recovery against a primary insurer to prevent a primary insurer from taking advantage of an excess insurer, acting solely as such, when a potential judgment approaches the primary insurer’s policy limits.” 236 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Canal, 843 S.W.2d at 483).”
“”Stacking” refers to the concept of taking policy limits from multiple, but not overlapping, policies potentially covering the same lawsuit and adding those limits together. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 854-55 (Tex. 1994).”
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“Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the records show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate, by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All reasonable inferences supported by the evidence are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.2002). “[I]f a rational trier of fact might resolve the issues in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.””
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“Conversely, Plaintiff Thompson, alleged that Defendant Kindred, “[failed] to treat LOIS SNELLENBERGER courteously, fairly, and with the fullest measure of dignity.” [Docket No. 7 ¶ 8( l)]. Consequently, pursuant to the revised version of Fla. Stat. § 400.023(1), Plaintiff Thompson, is “required to elect either survival damages pursuant to s. 46.021 or wrongful death damages pursuant to s. 768.21” for the skin breakdown allegation, while she may “recover damages for the negligence that caused injury” to Lois Snellenberger for the dignity in treatment allegation. Plaintiff Thompson’s Amended Complaint complied with these requirements in both Counts.”
“Therefore, Plaintiff Thompson has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for negligence.”
“Therefore, Plaintiff Thompson, has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for a violation of residents’ rights pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 400.023.”
“As such, § 400.023 governs both statutory claims and common-law claims for negligence.”
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“Plaintiffs contend that Defendants do not fall within the scope of the PREP Act, in that the claims are not directed against Defendants’ role in the manufacturing, distribution, administration, or use of a covered countermeasure. (6605 Action, DE 6-1 at 12-13) Defendants respond that the negligence claims here fall within the PREP Act, because they do “originate[ ] and arise[ ] from Defendants’ allocation, use, distribution, procurement and administration of various ‘covered countermeasures’ in responding to, mitigating, or otherwise preventing the transmission of the COVID-19 virus, including, but not limited to, PPE.” (6605 Action, DE 8 at 11) My view of the matter is closer to that of Plaintiffs. The PREP Act, as amended, is an emergency response to the pandemic.”
“I start with the question of preemption. In general, preemption takes three forms: (1) “express” preemption, applicable when Congress expressly states its intent to preempt state law; (2) “field” preemption, applicable when “Congress’ intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred [because] the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive” or “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject;” and (3) “conflict” preemption, applicable when “state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,” even though Congress has not displaced all state law in a given area.”
“Field, or implied, preemption applies when federal law “so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.””
Statutes:
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“In general A skilled nursing facility must care for its residents in such a manner and in such an environment as will promote maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life of each resident. (B) Quality assessment and assurance A skilled nursing facility must maintain a quality assessment and assurance committee, consisting of the director of nursing services, a physician designated by the facility, and at least 3 other members of the facility’s staff, which (i) meets at least quarterly to identify issues with respect to which quality assessment and assurance activities are necessary and (ii) develops and implements appropriate plans of action to correct identified quality deficiencies. A State or the Secretary may not require disclosure of the records of such committee except insofar as such disclosure is related to the compliance of such committee with the requirements of this subparagraph. (2) Scope of services and activities under plan of care A skilled nursing facility must provide services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident, in accordance with a written plan of care which- (A) describes the medical, nursing, and psychosocial needs of the resident and how such needs will be met; (B) is initially prepared, with the participation to the extent practicable of the resident or the resident’s family or legal representative, by a team which includes the resident’s attending physician and a registered professional nurse with responsibility for the resident; and (C) is periodically reviewed and revised by such team after each assessment under paragraph (3). (3) Residents’ assessment (A) Requirement A skilled nursing facility must conduct a comprehensive, accurate, standardized, reproducible assessment of each resident’s functional capacity, which assessment-“
“In general Subject to the timeframes prescribed by the Secretary under section 1395yy(e)(6) of this title, such an assessment must be conducted- (I) promptly upon (but no later than 14 days after the date of) admission for each individual admitted on or after October 1, 1990, and by not later than January 1, 1991, for each resident of the facility on that date; (II) promptly after a significant change in the resident’s physical or mental condition; and (III) in no case less often than once every 12 months. (ii) Resident review The skilled nursing facility must examine each resident no less frequently than once every 3 months and, as appropriate, revise the resident’s assessment to assure the continuing accuracy of the assessment. (D) Use The results of such an assessment shall be used in developing, reviewing, and revising the resident’s plan of care under paragraph (2). (E) Coordination Such assessments shall be coordinated with any State-required preadmission screening program to the maximum extent practicable in order to avoid duplicative testing and effort.”
“In general Except as provided in clause (ii), a skilled nursing facility must provide 24-hour licensed nursing service which is sufficient to meet nursing needs of its residents and must use the services of a registered professional nurse at least 8 consecutive hours a day, 7 days a week. (ii) Exception To the extent that clause (i) may be deemed to require that a skilled nursing facility engage the services of a registered professional nurse for more than 40 hours a week, the Secretary is authorized to waive such requirement if the Secretary finds that- (I) the facility is located in a rural area and the supply of skilled nursing facility services in such area is not sufficient to meet the needs of individuals residing therein, (II) the facility has one full-time registered professional nurse who is regularly on duty at such facility 40 hours a week, (III) the facility either has only patients whose physicians have indicated (through physicians’ orders or admission notes) that each such patient does not require the services of a registered nurse or a physician for a 48-hour period, or has made arrangements for a registered professional nurse or a physician to spend such time at such facility as may be indicated as necessary by the physician to provide necessary skilled nursing services on days when the regular full-time registered professional nurse is not on duty, (IV) the Secretary provides notice of the waiver to the State long-term care ombudsman (established under section 307(a)(12) 1 of the Older Americans Act of 1965) and the protection and advocacy system in the State for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded, and (V) the facility that is granted such a waiver notifies residents of the facility (or, where appropriate, the guardians or legal representatives of such residents) and members of their immediate families of the waiver.”
“Except as provided in clause (ii), a skilled nursing facility must not use on a full-time basis any individual as a nurse aide in the facility on or after October 1, 1990 for more than 4 months unless the individual- (I) has completed a training and competency evaluation program, or a competency evaluation program, approved by the State under subsection (e)(1)(A), and (II) is competent to provide nursing or nursing-related services. (ii)”
Secondary Sources:
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“Senate Republicans introduced the SAFE TO WORK ACT (the “Act”) in July 2020, which would create a very broad liability shield for nearly all types of employers from COVID-19 related claims, including very broad protections for health care facilities and professions. [19] Specifically, the proposed legislation provides that “no health care provider shall be liable in a coronavirus-related medical liability action unless the plaintiff can prove by clear and convincing evidence—(1) gross negligence or willful misconduct by the health care provider; and (2) that the alleged harm, damage, breach, or tort resulting in the personal injury was directly caused by the alleged gross negligence or willful misconduct.” The Act also specifically states that “acts, omissions, or decisions resulting from a resource or staffing shortage shall not be considered willful misconduct or gross negligence.” [20] Notably, the immunity would be applicable in any legal proceeding, whether in state or federal court, and the Act would supersede and preempt any state law that provided lesser protections. [21] Although Senate Republicans had indicated immunity protections for all employers must be included with any new COVID-19 stimulus package, Senate Democrats—who now control the Senate—had indicated that they will not pass a bill with broad immunity protections.”
“A 2005 federal law, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (the “PREP Act”), enacted in the wake of an avian influenza outbreak, provides limited but noteworthy immunity as well. The PREP Act authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), upon a finding of a public health emergency or the credible threat of one, to issue a declaration providing limited immunity from legal claims relating to the use of specifically enumerated “countermeasures.” [23] The immunity does not extend to death or serious physical injury caused by willful misconduct. The Secretary issued a COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration on March 10, 2020, retroactive to February 4, 2020 and extending through October 1, 2024.”
Conclusion
The Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center case stands as a critical examination of how employment discrimination issues are navigated within complex corporate structures. This case not only sheds light on the legal challenges faced by individuals alleging racial discrimination but also underscores the responsibilities of corporations to ensure fair and equitable treatment of their employees. As legal landscapes evolve and corporate structures become increasingly intricate, this case offers valuable insights into the interplay between corporate liability and employment law. It serves as a poignant reminder of the ongoing need for vigilance against workplace discrimination and the importance of legal avenues in upholding employee rights.
